The collectivization of Soviet agriculture gave rise to a massive wave of peasant protest and violence in the countryside during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Peasant unrest began on the eve of wholesale collectivization in 1928 during the implementation of "extraordinary measures" (i.e., forced requisitions) in state grain procurements. It continued, at varying levels of intensity, to the end of the First FiveYear Plan, by which time wholesale collectivization was basically Speakers at the Sixteenth Party Congress noted the key role played by women in the protest against collectivization and the collective farm. Although the extent and intensity of the women's protest were not specified, they were serious enough for Lazar Kaganovich to make the following remark:
We know that in connection with the excesses [neperu6bi] in the collective farm movement, women in the countryside in many cases played the most "advanced" role in the reaction against the collective farm.9 A. A. Andreev, the first secretary of the North Caucasus Regional Party Committee, seconded Kaganovich, claiming that women were in the vanguard in the protests and disturbances over collectivization. 10 These claims received concrete substantiation in reports written by workers and officials who served in the countryside during collectivization. 11 The reasons for the "vanguard" role of peasant women in the protest against collectivization were considered to be the low cultural and political level and backwardness of peasant women, the "incorrect approach" of rural officials, "dizzy from success," to the volatile women, and, finally, the exploitation of the women's irrational fears and potential for mass hysteria by the kulak and the omnipresent podkulachnik. 
Ba6bu 6ynmbl

27
The party's response to women's protest against collectivization was different from its response to (male) peasant protest in general, which was usually labeled kulak opposition and dealt with by increasing the level of repression. Instead of repressive measures (although these were not always excluded), the party emphasized a more "correct approach" to peasant women-an end to the excesses-on the part of rural officials and the need to improve work among women.12 The importance of work among women, in fact, had been a concern from at least the time of the grain procurement crisis when the potential dangers of female-led opposition to Soviet policy became clear.13 Work among women basically had two objectives. First, it was held necessary to educate women and expand political indoctrination among them. A second task was drawing more women into active involvement in the political life of the village through participation in the women's delegate meetings, soviet elections, and membership in local soviets and the Communist Party. And, indeed, during the years of collectivization, there was a gradual, but noted improvement in such work as local officials were implored to pay more attention to women and increasing numbers of women were recruited to the party and elected to the boards of local soviets.14 The state's response and its emphasis on the need to improve work among women were predicated upon the official conception of peasant women's protest as essentially non-political and a function of the ignorance and backwardness of the baba. Nevertheless, the party's efforts were too little and too late. Moreover, and despite periodic waves of party and government expulsions and purges to offset local excesses, the party's contradictory demands of a "correct approach" to the peasantry and the timely implementation of often brutal policies made it highly unlikely that the rough, civil-war methods of rural officials would be or could be tempered or civilized. Nor could the party mitigate the effect that it perceived the kulak and podkulachnik had in sparking women's opposition and the bab'i bunty. As a consequence, the party failed to quiet the fears of many peasant women or to prevent the wave of bab'i bunty that erupted in the countryside as a reaction to both rumor and reality.
The Communist Party claimed that the underlying basis of women's protest during collectivization was irrational female hysteria unleashed by the "kulak agitprop," or the rumor-mill, and reinforced by the women's petit bourgeois, small landholder instincts. It was true that the rumor-mill often played a very important role in sparking bab'i bunty and women's protest; it was also true that peasant women's "petit bourgeois instincts" played a central role in their opposition to collectivization and the transformation of the life of the village that it entailed. However, the protest engendered by the rumor-mill and by some of the policies of collectivization was not always "irrational" or the manifestation of a petit bourgeois class consciousness.
Rumors about collectivization and the collective farm raged through the countryside. Heated discussions took place in village squares, at the wells, in the cooperative shops, and at the market. 15 At one and the same time, there were tales of the return of the Whites and the pomeshchiki (landlords), the coming of Antichrist, Polish pans, and the Chinese, the arrival of commissars, Bolsheviks, Communists, and Soviet gendarmes, and impending famine and devastation.16 Among the rumors were many that struck a particular resonance in the minds and hearts of peasant women. These rumors, broadly speaking, touched upon questions of religion, the family, and everyday life. 
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Some of them assumed fantastic dimensions; others-whether fantastic or not-were sometimes based on actual occurrences.
Rumors concerning the Apocalypse were widespread at this time. During the initial stages of collectivization, there was a wholesale attack on religion and the Church, which, although largely the result of actions of local crusaders and militant atheists, was not officially condemned by Moscow until after March 1930. At this time, churches were closed down and transformed into clubs or offices, church bells were removed, village priests were hounded and imprisoned, and icons were burned. Both the onslaught on religion and the scale of the general offensive on traditional ways of life in the village served to encourage an apocalyptic mindset among the peasantry.
The collective farm became the symbol of the Antichrist on earth. In one village, old women asked, "Is it true or not?-they say that all who join the collective farm will be signed over to the Antichrist."17 On the eve of collectivization, reports from the North Caucasus claimed that a certain personage assuming the identity of Christ was wandering through the villages proclaiming the coming of the Last Judgment. He had in his possession a document from the Virgin Mary calling for everyone to leave the collective farm prior to Judgment Day or else to face the wrath of God. The Christ of the North Caucasus also had a blacklist of collective farmers for use on Judgment Day.18 When, in the autumn of 1929, the church was closed in the Ukrainian village of Bochkarko, it was claimed that a miraculous light issued from the church and a sign appeared on the cupola, which read: "Do not join the collective farm or I will smite thee."19 In the village of Brusianka (Bazhenskii raion, Sverdlovskii okrug, in the Urals), tickets to the next world went on sale; they were sold in three classes and prices ranged from 50 kopeks to 2 rubles 50 kopeks.20
Peasant women were especially susceptible to rumors about the Apocalypse and Antichrist and to news of events like those described above. The peasant woman was the upholder of religion within the village and household, so it was natural that the attacks on religion and the Church often affected women most acutely. The peasant woman, however, was also said to be particularly responsive to tales of the supernatural. It may be that women's protest sparked by such fantastic rumors was based on a combination of devotion to the faith and superstition. It may also be that tales of the Apocalypse, which forecast an imminent cataclysm in which God destroys the ruling powers of evil and raises the righteous to life in a messianic kingdom, served as a religious justification (either perceived to be real or exploited as a pretext) for peasant resistance to the state or provided a peasant vocabulary of protest.21 Whether a particular form of peasant protest, a pretext for resistance, or an irrational impulse, peasant women's protest raised by religious rumors and the attack on the Church derived at least in part from legitimate concerns over the fate of the Church and the believers.
There were also rumors that touched upon questions of the family and everyday life and that were especially troubling to peasant women. Some of these rumors were in the realm of the absurd, such as the rumor that spread through the countryside that four thousand young peasant women were to be sent to China to pay for the Far Eastern railroad or the variation of this rumor, which stated that only women weighing over three and one half puds (approximately 126 pounds) would be sent to China.22 Mikhail Sholokhov in the novel Virgin Soil Upturned provides another example of rumor in the category of the absurd, most probably a variation of a rumor in actual circulation. Sholokhov writes:
There was a nun in the village the day before yesterday .... She spent the night at Timofei Borshchov's and told them the fowls had been got together so we could send them to town for the townsfolk to make noodle soup with, then we would fix up little chairs for the old women, a special shape, with straw on them, and make them sit on our eggs until they hatched, and any old woman who rebelled would be tied to her chair.23 This rumor clearly verged on the fantastic, but it should be noted that it was based on two real grievances that women held during collectivization. These concerned the socialization of domestic livestock-the economic mainstay of a peasant woman's existence-and the introduction of incubators, opposition to which was due either to the fact that 21 During the Schism, the Old Believers often expressed protest in similar terms.
Moreover, an apocalyptic mindset among peasants seems to be a characteristic response at times of momentous upheaval and transformation. 
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their use was predicated on the socialization of poultry or else the perhaps frightening novelty of their appearance.
In addition to these rumors, there were a series of rumors of equally fantastic dimensions, which claimed that collectivization would bring with it the socialization of children, the export of women's hair, communal wife-sharing, and the notorious common blanket under which all collective farmers, both male and female, would sleep.24 These rumors were of obvious concern to women and, moreover, very possibly were inspired by cases when local officials either attempted to implement similar practices or told peasants that such practices were in the offing. For example, the 25,000er Gorbunevskii, working in the Crimea, announced on 1 March 1930 that his collective farm would become a commune and that all of the peasant children would be socialized. When the parents of the soon-to-be socialized children heard this, they began a massive slaughter of their also soon-to-be socialized livestock, fortunately sparing the children. that henceforth there would be no more individual blankets; all would sleep on a 700 meter-long bed under a 700 meter-long blanket.28 Many of these rumors clearly played upon the real fears of peasant women concerning issues of family and everyday life. Moreover, given the enormity of the transformation implemented by the state at this time along with the "excesses," the horrendously low level of rural officialdom, and the actual occurrence of any number of bizarre instances such as those described above, one can only say with difficulty that peasant women's protest was irrational. One could perhaps claim, as Petro Grigorenko suggests in his memoirs, that women often simply exploited the rumors of the absurd, without really believing them, as a way to attack the collective farm under the guise of irrational, nonpolitical protest and, consequently, as a way to avoid the suppression of resistance by outside forces (armed civilian forces, security troops, or the militia) as might have been the case in an overtly anti-Soviet village uprising.29 The plausibility of this suggestion will be examined below. For now, it is sufficient to conclude that, whether pretext or actual belief, the rumor-mill struck a deep chord among peasant women who saw many of their most cherished beliefs and domestic interests under attack.
Rumors, however, were not always the spark behind the bab'i bunty. Quite often, protest was triggered directly by clearly articulated opposition to the implementation of radical policies. This opposition raises the issue of the "petit bourgeois instincts" of peasant women. Such "instincts," indeed, formed a part of the basis for resistance and figure largely in the rumor-mill, but opposition to policy deriving from so-called "petit bourgeois" concerns was often less motivated by "instinct" than by a set of rational interests, revolving around the family and the domestic economy. For example, peasant women led the protest against attempts to socialize domestic livestock because the domestic livestock was generally the basis and justification of the woman's economic position within the household. Women also protested directly and without recourse to the rumor-mill over issues concerning their children. Once again, the socialization of domestic livestock could be a threat because the loss of a milch cow could very well mean that peasant children would be without milk.30 In later years, 
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Stalin even admitted how important an issue the loss of a cow had been in provoking women's opposition to the collective farm when he said, "in the not too distant past, Soviet power had a little misunderstanding with the collective farm women. The issue was cows."31 In one village, a babii bunt occurred over the proposed closing of a mill. The women's concern here was that, "we cannot feed our children" if the mill closes down.32 Some women also objected to the introduction of nurseries. According to Maurice Hindus, the Ukrainian-born American reporter, this was due to the high infant mortality rate in the village. Hindus claimed that there was not a woman in the village that he visited who had not lost a child in infancy, so it was natural that these women were reluctant to entrust their children to the care of others. (This reluctance, moreover, was particularly appropriate, given the experience of caring for socialized livestock.)33 None of these concerns derived from "instinct"; rather, they were legitimate and articulate protest against specific policies and practices associated with the initial stages of collectivization.
It is evident that official perceptions of the basis of peasant women's protest were at least in part misconceived and that the content of women's protest was rational and based on legitimate concerns. The question that now arises is the extent to which official perceptions about the form of women's protest, the babii bunt, were accurate?
The bab'i bunty were depicted as spontaneous outbursts of mass hysteria marked by indiscriminate violence, disorder, and a cacophony of high-pitched voices all shouting demands at once. Groups of women assembled at the village square became "milling crowds." And behind every babii bunt could be found a kulak or podkulachnik agitator who exploited the ignorant, irrational babas. Instead of calmly discussing grievances in an organized, "cultured" manner, reports describing women's protest claimed, for example, that, at soviet meetings, the women would simply vote against all measures of Soviet power regardless of content or that, at secret meetings against the collective farm in March and April 1930, the women (who formed the majority of those in attendance and were the most active participants) would all talk at once with neither chairman or agenda, in an atmosphere of bedlam.34 Women often physically blocked the carting away of requisitioned grain Despite warnings to disperse, the crowd, "supported by the general din," continued its protest, knocking to the ground and beating a member of the local soviet. At this point, other soviet activists entered the fray and, according to the report, prevented the crowd from realizing its presumed intentions of beating the activist to unconsciousness. The case was brought to the attention of the regional court, which prosecuted the ten most active babas and the miller Fomin, who was described as the "ideological instigator" of the disturbance. Fomin, who was also charged with setting fire to the local soviet secretary's home, was prosecuted separately, according to "special consideration." The women, prosecuted under article 592 of the criminal code for mass disturbances, were given sentences of imprisonment with strict isolation ranging from two to three years.
The Belovka case was reexamined by the Supreme Court in January 1930, at which time the decision of the regional court was overturned. The Supreme Court held Fomin exclusively responsible for the women's actions, describing him as the "ideological inspiration," the "ideological leader [BoxaK ' and main "culprit" in the disturbance.
Fomin's "counterrevolutionary organizational role" in the disturbance was the "actual root" of the babii bunt and, according to the Supreme
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Court, the regional court had failed to discern this clearly enough. In addition, the Supreme Court accused the local soviet of Belovka of insufficient preliminary preparatory work among women, something that could have mitigated the effects of Fomin's propaganda. Finally, the sentences of the women, all described as illiterate, middle and lower-middle peasants, and representative of the "most backward part of the peasantry" (i.e., women), were lessened to forced labor within the village for periods ranging from six months to one year. The purpose of the sentences was to serve as a warning and an educational measure and not as punishment. 35 This case is instructive in illuminating official views of and reactions to peasant women's protest. In Belovka, the women were viewed as no more than naive dupes of the local kulaks who served as a figurative battering ram against Soviet power. The local soviet's failure to work among the women and prepare them for the new policy transformed them into ammunition, which the kulak could fire at the Soviet regime. However, the Belovka case may not tell the whole story of the bab'i bunty. Petro Grigorenko, in his memoirs, described the bab'i bunty as a kind of "tactic. This disturbance, like many others, was not suppressed, but simply ended with the collapse of the collective farm.37 A similar situation was described by the worker Zamiatin who was among those workers recruited from the city soviets in early 1930 to work in the local rural soviets. Zamiatin depicted the situation faced by the 25,000er V. Klinov. Zamiatin said that the approach to Klinov's village resembled an "armed camp"; on his way, he saw a sign nailed to a bridge that read: "Vas'ka [Klinov] you scum, get out. We will break your legs." When he arrived, Zamiatin found the village alive with rumors of the approach of a band of riders who were coming to kill all the Communists and collective farmers. In this village, dekulakization had already been implemented but, as happened elsewhere, the kulaks were not yet removed from the village. This omission, according to Zamiatin, had led to the crisis that existed. With Zamiatin's arrival, Klinov set about preparing for the exile of the kulaks. He began by removing the church bell, which traditionally served as tocsin to gather together the peasants in case of emergency. The heads of kulak families were exiled, and all went well until one of the exiled kulaks returned to announce that the other kulaks would soon be coming back to seek vengeance. This led to the decision to exile the families of the exiled kulak heads of households. The announcement of this decision led to an uproar. The peasant women, in an attempt to forestall this action, blocked the entrances of the huts of the kulak families. Several days later, the women also led the opposition to the attempt to cart away the village's grain by blocking the grain warehouse. This led to a babii bunt, followed quickly by a general free-for-all in which all the peasants participated in a pitchfork battle. The disturbance was suppressed by the militia, which was called in after all of the peasants had joined the rebellion.38
In both of these cases, peasant women were responsible for initiating the resistance and were soon joined by the peasant men in a general village riot. In a classic depiction of a babii bunt in a Cossack village in Virgin Soil Upturned, the Cossack men stood at the back of the crowd of women urging them on when they attacked the chairman of the local soviet. Here, the women led the attack on the grain warehouse "with Here, as elsewhere, the babii bunt was the first stage in a general peasant riot. Here too the women had specific aims and, whether the riots were intended to dissolve the collective farm, halt dekulakization, or retake socialized seed and livestock, they accomplished their aims.
Women tended to lead the village riots because they were less vulnerable to repression than peasant men. There were even reports of bab'i bunty in 1929 when the women brought their children with them into battle or laid down in front of tractors to block collectivization.41 In the bab'i bunty, the men stood to the side. In non-violent protest, the situation was similar. Peasant men frequently allowed their female relatives to express opposition to policy. According to a report of a worker brigade in Tambov, in the Central Black Earth Region, the men did not go to the meetings on collectivization, but sent the women instead. When asked why they did not attend the meetings, the men replied, "They [the women] are equal now, as they decide so we will agree ...."42 In this way, it was easy for a peasant to claim that he had not joined the collective farm or surrendered his grain because his wife would not let him or threatened him with divorce. The 25,000er Gruzdev was told by one peasant, "my wife does not want to socialize our cow, so I cannot do this."43 One peasant man explained the power of women's protest frequently had a specific goal in mind (dissolving the collective farm, seizing socialized seed or livestock, halting grain requisitions or dekulakization, etc.). Second, the women's protest was frequently based upon opposition to specific policies and, whether inspired by seemingly irrational rumors, rumors used as a pretext for resistance, or direct opposition to the implementation of policy, it derived from rational and legitimate concerns and socio-economic interests, which were under attack by the state. Third, peasant women's protest seems to have served as a comparatively safe outlet for peasant opposition in general and as a screen to protect the more politically vulnerable male peasants who could not oppose policy as actively or openly without serious consequence but who, nevertheless, could and did either stand silently, and threateningly, in the background or join in the disturbance once protest had escalated to a point where men might enter the fray as defenders of their female relatives. Finally, an important feature distinguished women's protest from protest (generally led by males) officially branded as "counterrevolutionary." Many of the counterrevolutionary cases prosecuted under article 58 of the criminal code in late 1929 and early 1930 occurred while the defendants were drunk. Women's protest, on the other hand, appears to have been, with few exceptions, sober and, consequently, perhaps, more rational than male protest46
Several other conclusions about official perceptions of the bab'i bunty and women's protest supplement direct observations on the nature of peasant women's opposition during collectivization. First of all, the bab'i bunty were very much a part of the traditional peasant approach to political protest. Peasants rarely resisted the state through organized political action. Their resistance often assumed the aspect of a spontaneous, disorganized, irrational bunt. However, peasant rebellions frequently merely appeared irrational to outside observers, who were powerless to cope with massive explosions of discontent and who, in the case of the bab'i bunty, were reluctant to resort to armed force to quell riots.47 The outside observers who wrote about the bab'i bunty tended, in addition, to be city people or, at the very least, of a higher cultural level than the peasants and, consequently, had a very different conception of the forms that protest and rebellion were expected to all women to join the protest or face a fine of three rubles. assume. The rudimentary organization behind the bab'i bunty and the specific grievances articulated in protest were often, in the eyes of outside observers, overshadowed or impossible to discern against the backdrop of apparent pandemonium.
Second, and of equal importance, there is a real possibility that the Communist Party was aware of the true nature and dynamics of the bab'i bunty and women's protest during collectivization. As Field has argued, the "myth of the tsar" was as useful to the tsarist government as it was to the peasantry. It was based on the "myth of the peasant" and provided the regime with a rationalization for any problems leading to peasant disturbances.48 In the Soviet context, the myth of the peasant could serve several purposes. First, official images of the bab'i bunty and peasant women's protest could be manipulated to minimize the true nature and extent of the opposition engendered by collectivization. Second, it served a particularly useful purpose when women's protest engulfed entire villages, including poor and middle peasant women. In these cases, the party had a ready rationalization for the contradictions of the class struggle in the village, for its failure to capture the support of its poor and middle peasant allies among the peasantry. Finally, particular injustices could be attributed to officials who, it was said, were violating the essentially correct policy of the center. In this way, Moscow could, and often did, seek to divert grievances from the state to local officials, who were frequently used as scapegoats. Moreover, it is clear that, at least in the months following the March 1930 retreat, peasants also adhered or pretended to adhere to this rationalization, displaying a Soviet-style naive monarchism which pitted rural officials against Stalin and the Central Committee of the Communist Party.49
Peasant women played an important role in the protest that consumed many Russian and Ukrainian villages during the First Five-Year Plan, and it is important to attempt to understand the nature of this protest and the state's response to it. Yet, one cannot claim that all women were united, on the basis of similar interests, in opposition to the collective farm. Dorothy Atkinson has suggested that there were also women (widows, heads of households, wives of seasonal workers) who supported collectivization because of the difficulties of working their land alone and women, mostly young, who were genuinely 
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The bab'i bunty and the outspoken protest of peasant women do not appear to have continued beyond the First Five-Year Plan. Nevertheless, during the early years of collectivization, the bab'i bunty and women's protest proved the most effective form of peasant opposition to the Soviet state. Peasant women played an important role in the resistance to collectivization, defending their interests and demonstrating a degree of organization and conscious political opposition rarely acknowledged.
